Home > The Saharawis > Conflict
An OverviewWestern Sahara is the subject of a territorial dispute between Morocco, which annexed the territory in 1975 and claims sovereignty there, and the Polisario Front, the national liberation movement representing the Saharawis, which calls for an independent state in the territory.
Currently, Western Sahara is divided politically, militarily, and geographically by a 2,200 km-long Moroccan-built defensive berm. About a fifth of the territory, lying east of the berm, is controlled by the Polisario Front. The sixteen-year war that broke out in 1975, when Morocco and Mauritania jointly invaded Western Sahara upon Spain’s rapid exit from its former colony, is undoubtedly the single most important cause behind the large-scale displacement of the Saharawi population. Today, most of them are still refugees in the barren and remote desert of south-west Algeria. They live in camps run by the Polisario Front. The government-in-exile, the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), also operates from the camps Exact figures for the size of the refugee population are difficult to obtain, and have been a source of contention. The most consistent figure quoted by numerous non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the Algerian authorities is between 155,000 and 165,000. Outside of Western Sahara, the refugees are the largest Saharawi community. Significant but much smaller ones exist in Mauritania, mainland Spain, and the Canary Islands. Morocco’s ongoing occupation of Western Sahara (Mauritania withdrew in 1979) is a violation of international law and has resulted in systematic human rights abuses over the years. These have been documented extensively by internationally respected human rights organizations. So far, all efforts by the United Nations (UN) to achieve a long-lasting and peaceful solution to the conflict have been thwarted. The Organization of African Unity–United Nations (OAU–UN) sponsored a Settlement Plan intended to culminate in a referendum for Saharawi self-determination in early 1992, but this has been repeatedly postponed. Morocco, meanwhile, has strengthened its de facto annexation of Western Sahara in the period since the UN brokered a cease-fire and deployed its forces in 1991. Roughly 200,000 Moroccan settlers have been moved into the so-called Southern Province, and active steps have been taken to develop the territory and exploit its natural resources.  Saharawi landmine victim, by Simon Thorpe 2004 Initiatives pursued outside the framework of the UN Peace Plan since 2000 to overcome the impasse have yielded few results. Any future resolution will need to address the repatriation and security of the Saharawi refugees and the demining of the area along the Moroccan berm, believed to harbour between 1 million and 2 million landmines.
The BermThe Berm refers to the artificial separation barrier constructed as a defensive structure by the Moroccan occupants of the Western Sahara territory. Also known as the Wall of Shame, the Berm is approximately 2,700km long and three metres high made of sand and rubble dividing the occupied territory from the liberated zone. Over the course of the sixteen-year war, Morocco built up a massive military presence in Western Sahara that involved the building of the Berm in six stages by the Royal Moroccan Army from Summer 1980 until Spring 1987. First only to surround the resource-rich area of Al-Auin, Smara and the phosphate mines at Bu Craa, the Berm soon consolidated all the areas held from the north to the south: from south-eastern Morocco and to the tip of Mauritania’s north-western border.
Built with substantial military and financial assistance from the USA and Israel, the berm has been fortified with an estimated 1–2 million anti-tank and anti-personnel landmines, and is manned by 100,000–200,000 soldiers. Stationed along the berm at around 10-km intervals are 240 heavy artillery units equipped with sophisticated surveillance equipment. Reminiscent of the Berlin wall, or the wall currently being erected in Palestine, the berm was meant to protect the economic interests of the Moroccan occupation. It also aimed to undermine the effectiveness of Polisario strikes that had succeeded in reaching the Western Sahara’s Atlantic coast, and to deter fishing activities. By the late 1980s the costs of the war and the limited effectiveness of the wall eventually convinced King Hassan II to seek a peaceful solution. From this emerged the OAU–UN-sponsored Settlement Plan {LINK}, agreed to by both parties in 1988 and adopted in a 1991 UN Security Council resolution. Learn more: The Elusive ReferendumHad the OAU–UN Settlement Plan been implemented by now, the Saharawis would almost undoubtedly be an independent nation. A UN-organized referendum scheduled to take place in early 1992 was designed to give the Saharawis a choice between independence or integration with Morocco. The electorate would have been based on the Saharawi population as identified in a Spanish census of 1974. But this referendum has never taken place, and the UN mandate to continue the mission, known as United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), has been extended countless times. A mission that was projected to cost around US$200 million has now run over three times the original budget. Morocco’s categorical unwillingness to consider the possible existence of an independent Western Sahara has presented endless obstacles to the process. Its intransigence, however, has also been coupled with a general lack of international will to enforce its own UN Security Council resolutions and pressure Morocco to co-operate with the Settlement Plan. For years the process was stalled; first, on interpretation over voter eligibility, then on appeals eligibility. When in 1997 former US Secretary of State James Baker came on board as Special Envoy, he got the two parties to sign up to the Houston Agreements, which entailed a code of conduct for the identification phase. A provisional list of eligible voters was finally published at the end of 1999, and the referendum seemed imminent. But Morocco, which had been opposed to the publication of the list, began clamouring for another lengthy round of appeals. The UN at this stage agreed to let Baker explore solutions outside the framework of the Settlement Plan in 2000. Websites: Human Rights Watch: ‘Keeping It Secret: The United Nations Operation in the Western Sahara’ – http://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/Wsahara.htm Initially, in 2001, Baker came up with a vague one-page proposal known as the Draft Framework. It effectively subverted the letter and spirit of the referendum process, as it would allow the addition of Moroccan settlers to the voters’ rolls. The Saharawis rejected it outright. Experts, and certainly the Polisario, regarded it as a flagrant attempt to legitimize Morocco’s occupation. In 2003, Baker returned with a fleshed-out version of the Draft Framework. This time, the main difference was a clarification that at the end of a transitional period of autonomy, under provisional Moroccan sovereignty, eligible Saharawis and the bulk of settlers would vote for either independence, continued autonomy, or complete integration. Also, both parties to the conflict would be barred from intimate involvement in the referendum process. To everyone’s surprise, Polisario accepted this revised Baker plan with some reservation. Now called the Peace Plan for the Self-determination of Western Sahara, it was also approved by the UN Security Council. Morocco, however, rejected it on the basis that it would lose control over the process and that independence had been included as an option. In mantra-like fashion, Morocco has since openly stated that it will only work towards a solution which does not either affect its national sovereignty or territorial integrity. This, of course, is a very different tune to the one it played for years when it appeared to go along with the OAU–UN Settlement Plan. In an attempt to break the impasse, the UN embarked on confidence-building measures between the two sides. Under the auspices of the UNHCR, a five-day exchange of visits between close family members from both sides of the berm began in March 2004, to be continued under review for a period of 6 months thereafter. A phone service was also set up between the camps and the Moroccan-occupied territory, and plans were made to have a mail service too, if the Moroccans agreed. The hope was that all these steps would generate a favourable climate for both sides to work towards an agreement based on the latest plan, which the UN Secretary General deemed the best way forward. In June 2004, frustrated by the lack of progress, Baker resigned as Special Envoy to Kofi Annan, casting yet more uncertainty over the future of the UN mission in Western Sahara. Subsequent special envoys have failed to make any breakthroughs over the deadlock. Towards the end of Kofi Annan’s term, direct negotiations began to be pursued between Morocco and the Polisario under UN auspices. Again this has not yielded any encouraging results and Morocco has become more adamant than ever in refusing a solution which includes the option of independence for the Saharawis. As we approach nearly 2 decades of failed diplomacy, broken promises and unfulfilled dreams, the Saharawis, and particularly the youth, are reaching a breaking point and increasingly calling for the UN to leave Western Sahara and let the Saharawis follow their own course of action. Websites: Content for Saharawi Resistance Under Occupation will be available shortly. |
